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Abstract 
 
Biometric cryptography is a technique using biometric 
features to encrypt data, which can improve the security 
of the encrypted data and overcome the shortcomings of 
the traditional cryptography. This paper proposes a novel 
biometric cryptosystem based on the most accurate 
biometric feature -- iris. In encryption phase, a quantified 
256-dimension textural feature vector is firstly extracted 
from the preprocessed iris image using a set of 2-D 
Gabor filters. At the same time, an error-correct-code 
(ECC) is generated using Reed-Solomon algorithm. Then 
the feature vector is translated to a cipher key using Hash 
function. Some general encryption algorithms use this 
cipher key to encrypt the secret information. In decryption 
phase, a feature vector extracted from the input iris is 
firstly corrected using the ECC. Then it is translated to 
the cipher key using the same Hash function. Finally, the 
corresponding general decryption algorithms use the key 
to decrypt the information. Experimental results 
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed system. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Information security is becoming increasingly 
important in nowadays and cryptography is one of the 
most effective ways to enhance the information security. 
In the traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as AES, 
DES and RSA etc., information is encrypted using cipher 
key. The simple keys are easy to be memorized while 
they are also easy to be cracked. And the complex keys 
are difficult to be cracked while they are also difficult to 
be remembered and have to be stored in somewhere, 
which can be stolen or lost. Biometric cryptography, 
which uses biometric features to encrypt the information, 
can overcome this problem.  Currently, some biometric 
cryptographic algorithms have been developed based on 
fingerprints [1-4], iris [5-7], face [8], voice [9], signature 
[10] and palmprints [11] etc. 
Among the common biometric features, iris is the most 
accurate feature and can be effectively used in biometric 
cryptography. Davida [5, 6] proposed an iris 
cryptographic method based on the error-correcting and 
hashing techniques. This method supposed that the errors 
of the iris templates used for encryption and decryption 
were no more than 10%. Actually, these errors should be 
up to 30%. And the stored error-correcting code may leak 
biometric information. Hao [7] regarded the difference 
between the decrypting and encrypting iris codes as 
noises and used Hadamard code and Reed-Solomon code 
to correct these noises. The limitation of their system is 
that the security is somewhat low (the cracking ratio is 2-
44). To improve the security, this paper proposes a novel 
cryptosystem based on iris key generation. The Reed-
Solomon error-correcting algorithm and Hash function are 
employed to translate the iris textural feature vector to a 
cipher key for encryption and decryption. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 introduces the framework of our cryptosystem. Section 
3 presents the process of iris feature vector extraction. 
Section 4 discusses the encrypting and decrypting 
processes. Section 5 contains some experimental results 
and analysis. And Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
 
2. Framework of the Proposed System 
 
As we know, for a traditional symmetrical 
cryptographic system, the decrypting key should be 
exactly identical with the encrypting key. However, the 
features extracted from the different images of the same 
iris always have some difference, which may be caused 
by CCD camera pixel noise, iris distortion, eyelashes and 
eyelids occlusion etc. Therefore, the iris features cannot 
be directly used as a cipher key.  To solve this problem, 
this paper uses some error-correcting algorithm to 
eliminate the difference.  
Fig. 1 shows the frameworks of the iris cryptosystem. 
During the encryption phase, a quantified textural feature 
vector (FV) is firstly extracted from the encryption iris. At 
the same time, an error-correct-code (ECC) is generated 
using Reed-Solomon algorithm. Then the feature vector is 
translated to a cipher key using a Hash function. Some 
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general encryption algorithms use the key to encrypt the 
secret message. 
When decrypting, an iris feature vector extracted from 
the input iris is firstly corrected using the ECC. Then it is 
translated to a cipher key using the same Hash function as 
the encryption phase. Finally, the corresponding general 
decryption algorithms use the cipher key to get back the 
encrypted message. 
 
 
(a) Encryption phase 
 
(b) Decryption phase 
 
Figure 1. Framework of the proposed cryptosystem 
 
3. Feature Extraction 
 
We use the preprocessing method described in [12] to 
localize and normalize the iris. Considering that the upper 
eyelid, the lower eyelid and the eyelash often cover the 
iris, we define a region of interesting (ROI) as the inner 
3/4 part of the lower half of an iris, which contains 
enough information to distinguish different irises [13]. 
We then normalize the ROI into a rectangular block of 
256 × 64 pixels (shown in Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Preprocessing of iris 
 
A 2-D real Gabor filter is defined as following: 
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Where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal plane wave, α 
and β are the space constants of the Gaussian envelope 
along x' and y' axis respectively, θ denotes the orientation 
of Gabor filter. 
The normalized iris image is filtered by a set of 2-D 
real Gabor filters with θ = 0, 45, 90 and 135 degree. Some 
examples of the filtered image are shown in Fig. 3. And 
then each filtered image is equally divided into 16×4 
blocks.  And for each block, the mean is computed. That 
is, we can get 16×4×4 = 256 values from an iris image to 
form a 256-D iris vector. Because of some uncertain 
factors such as noise, distortion, eyelashes and eyelids 
occlusion, etc, the different images from the same iris are 
not exactly identical. Therefore, the iris vectors of these 
images should be some what different. We can normalize 
each component of the iris vectors to an integer in the 
range [0, 15] to remove the most difference. The 
normalized vector, called iris feature vector, is 
represented as following: 
),,,( 25621 MMMV …=                      (3) 
However, the normalization can not remove all of the 
difference between the iris feature vectors computed from 
the images of the same iris and there are still some 
components of the feature vectors are different. If the 
number of the different components of two iris feature 
vectors is less than a threshold T, they are regarded as the 
ones computed from the images of the same iris. 
Otherwise, they are regarded as the ones computed from 
the images of the different iris.  
 
Figure 3. Filtered images 
 
4. Encryption and Decryption 
     
The iris feature vector is used to generate a cipher key 
for encryption and decryption.  
In encryption phase, the feature vector of an iris is 
used to encrypt the message. Supposed that the length of 
the iris vector is N (256 in our experiments) and the 
difference threshold of the feature vectors from the same 
iris is T, we conduct the following steps to encrypt the 
message: 
1) Compute the Reed-Solomon codes (N+2T, N, T) 
of the feature vector. Reed-Solomon codes 
usually contain two parts: vector data and 
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correction codes. We only keep the correction 
codes as our error-correct-code (ECC). 
2) Translating the feature vector into a fix length iris 
key (HC) using a Hash function (e.g. MD5). 
3) Encrypting the message employing the iris key 
and some general symmetrical encryption 
algorithms (e.g. AES). 
In decryption phase, the feature vector of an iris is 
used to decrypt the secret message. The decryption 
procedure is listed as following: 
1) Using the standard Reed-Solomon decoding 
algorithm to correct the iris vector with the ECC. 
2) Translating the corrected vector into an iris key 
(HC) using the same Hash function with the 
encryption phase. 
3) Decrypting the message using this iris key and 
the corresponding general decryption algorithms 
(e.g. AES). 
If the decryption vector has a difference less than T 
with encryption iris, which means that these two vectors 
are computed from the images of the same iris, the Reed-
Solomon decoding algorithm can translate it to the same 
one with the encryption vector and the decryption should 
be successful. Otherwise, the decryption fails. 
To eliminate the rotation of the iris image, we translate 
the normalized images 7 times (-6, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4 and 6 
pixels), and use each translated one to decrypt the 
message until success. 
 
5. Experimental Results and Analysis 
 
To test the performance of our method, we use the 
public database CASIA 1.0 [14], which includes 108 
different irises and each iris has seven images with 
320×280 pixels in 256 gray levels. Because some of the 
pictures are defocused, motion blurred, or occluded by 
eyelids and eyelashes, we choose three images of each iris 
for experiments, in which two images are used for 
training, and the other for test. So, we have conducted 
altogether 108 (108×1) genuine decryptions and 11556 
(108×107) imposter decryptions. Fig. 4 shows the result 
of the FAR and FRR Curves of our experiment. Table 1 
lists some typical FAR/FRR and corresponding threshold. 
To prevent the impostor from successfully decrypting 
the data, the FAR should be 0. According to Fig. 5 and 
Table 1, the error number can be chosen as 107 and the 
corresponding FAR, FRR are 0%, 5.5556%. According to 
the theory of Reed-Solomon code, we can choose (570, 
256, 107) RS codes for error-correcting in our system. 
The possibility to recover the iris key from the ECC 
without the genuine iris can be computed as following: 
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That is, the security of this system is similar with that 
of a cipher key with 360 bits, which is much better than 
Hao’s method (44 bits) [7]. 
The FRR of our system is nearly 6%, which means that 
6% genuine users have to present their iris more than one 
time for decryption, which still can be accepted. 
 
 
Figure 4. FAR and FRR Curves 
 
Table 1. Typical FAR, FRR and Thresholds 
 
Threshold FAR(%) FRR(%) 
103 0 11.111 
104 0 8.3333 
105 0 6.4815 
106 0 6.4815 
107 0 5.5556 
108 0 5.5556 
109 0 5.5556 
110 0 5.5556 
111 0 5.5556 
112 0.0087 3.7037 
113 0.0173 2.7778 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper proposed a novel cryptosystem based on 
iris key generation. The system extracted quantified 
vector feature from iris and used Reed-Solomon error-
correcting algorithm and Hash function to generate the 
cipher key for encryption and decryption. Experimental 
results show that the proposed cryptosystem can work 
effectively. 
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In the future, we will test the proposed system on a 
large database and devise more effective feature 
extraction algorithm for this cryptosystem. 
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